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Allocating Vaccines and Antiviral Medications
During an Influenza Pandemic
∗

Carl H. Coleman
I.

INTRODUCTION

Influenza pandemics have been a regular occurrence through1
out human history. One difference between contemporary pandemics and those of the past is that today we have the capacity to develop
life-saving pharmaceutical interventions in the form of vaccines and
antiviral medications.
Unfortunately, while these interventions
should provide significant benefits to many people, the supply is likely to fall considerably short of the demand. An effective vaccine is
unlikely to be available until approximately six months after the onset
2
of a pandemic, and even after a vaccine is developed, there are unlikely to be sufficient supplies to vaccinate more than a small fraction
3
of the world’s population. As for antiviral medications, although the
United States is close to reaching its goal of stockpiling eighty-one
million treatment courses, the Institute of Medicine estimates that
∗

Professor of Law, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, Seton
Hall University School of Law. These brief remarks were presented in October
2008—before the emergence of the current H1N1 pandemic—as part of the Seton
Hall Law Review Symposium: Preparing for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic
Influenza. The author would like to thank the other panelists and audience members at the symposium for a lively and informative discussion.
1
See John G. Bartlett, Planning for Avian Influenza, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
141, 141 (2006) (noting that influenza pandemics have typically occurred several
times each century).
2
See Y. Guan et al., A Model to Control the Epidemic of H5N1 Influenza at the Source,
BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Nov. 13, 2007, at 6, http://www.biomedcentral.com/
content/pdf/1471-2334-7-132.pdf (concluding that “at most only a third of the global human population may have the chance of getting the vaccine at least six months
after the pandemic strain is identified”); see also World Health Org., Avian Influenza
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/
avian_faqs/en/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
3
See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Alan Wertheimer, Who Should Get Influenza Vaccine
When Not All Can?, 312 SCI. 854, 854 (2006) (suggesting that “more than 90% of the
U.S. population will not be vaccinated in the first year” of a pandemic); Lori UscherPines et al., Priority Setting for Pandemic Influenza: An Analysis of National Preparedness
Plans, 3 PLOS MED. 1721, 1721 (2006) (“At current capacity, we cannot expect to
vaccinate more than 14% of the world’s population within a year of a pandemic.”).
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more than twice that amount might be needed to treat twenty-five
percent of the population and to provide prophylactic treatment to
4
workers likely to be infected on the job. Moreover, it is not even
clear if the stockpiled medications will be effective. This year, the
dominant strain of the seasonal influenza virus has proven resistant to
5
Tamiflu, the primary stockpiled drug. If similar resistance develops
in a pandemic influenza strain, existing stockpiles could turn out to
be useless.
The limited availability of vaccines and antiviral medications during a pandemic means that difficult decisions will have to be made
about how to allocate these resources. Questions about allocating
scarce life-saving resources are not, of course, unique to pandemic
situations. For example, the demand for transplantable organs con6
sistently exceeds the supply, and, as a result, complex regulatory systems have been developed to ensure that organs are allocated fairly
7
and consistent with medical need. However, existing systems for allocating scarce resources like organs provide only limited guidance
for the type of decisions that will arise during an influenza pandemic.
First, during a pandemic, decisions will have to be made under crisis
circumstances, in the face of social unrest as well as uncertain and
evolving medical information. Regulatory systems will have to be flexible and responsive, and allocation criteria may have to be based on
broad generalities rather than case-by-case assessments of individual
needs. Second, unlike decisions about allocating organs, the impact
of which is felt primarily by individual patients, decisions about allocating vaccines and antivirals will have significant implications for all
of society. For example, because influenza is infectious, individuals
denied access to vaccines or antivirals will not only have a greater likelihood of becoming ill and dying, but they will also have a greater
chance of infecting other persons. Similarly, denials of care to essential service providers, such as health care workers or key government
4

COMM. ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTIVIRAL MEDICATION STRATEGIES FOR AN
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, INST. OF MED., ANTIVIRALS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: GUIDANCE
ON DEVELOPING A DISTRIBUTION AND DISPENSING PROGRAM 28 (2008), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309118662&page=28.
5
See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Major Flu Strain Found Resistant to Leading Drug, Puzzling Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A10.
6
Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture
Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 955, 955
(2007), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370.pdf.
7
In the United States, the system of organ allocation is managed by the United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), under contract with the Department of Health
and
Human
Services.
See
generally
UNOS:
Who
We
Are,
http://www.unos.org/whoweare/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
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officials, may increase risks to third parties by undermining society’s
ability to mount an effective response to the pandemic. As a result,
prioritization systems will have to take into account the externalities
of treatment denials, in addition to the impact on the individuals
seeking care.
While the details of national pandemic preparedness plans vary,
the general approach takes to the question of allocating vaccines and
8
antivirals is substantially similar. Overall, the primary goal is to save
the most lives possible, while simultaneously reducing social disrup9
tion and economic losses. These are certainly valuable goals, particularly in the context of a crisis in which society’s very existence may
be threatened. Yet, underlying the decision to pursue these goals are
several contestable value judgments that pandemic planners have not
always made explicit. My goal in these brief remarks is to highlight
three of these judgments: (1) the view that all individuals’ lives deserve equal protection, regardless of age; (2) the view that individuals
in particular occupational categories, especially “health care workers,” necessarily deserve greater protection than the rest of the population; and (3) the general assumption that the goal of prioritization
systems should be to maximize aggregate social welfare at the lowest
possible cost. These are by no means irrational approaches to the
challenge of allocating scarce life-saving resources, but they nonetheless have potentially problematic implications that warrant further
discussion.
II. APPROACHES TO THE ALLOCATION OF VACCINES AND ANTIVIRAL
MEDICATIONS IN NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PLANS
As concerns about the potential for a new influenza pandemic
have mounted, many countries have developed pandemic preparedness plans that explicitly address the allocation of vaccines and antiviral medications. In the United States, the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) has issued guidelines for the allocation
10
11
of both vaccines and antiviral medications. For vaccines, the guide8

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
10
See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
GUIDANCE ON ALLOCATING AND TARGETING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE 3–4 , available
at http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/vaccination/allocationguide.pdf (last visited
Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN].
11
See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON ANTIVIRAL DRUG USE
DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, available at http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/
vaccination/antiviral_use.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter DHHS,
ANTIVIRAL USE].
9
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lines divide individuals into target groups and then, within the target
12
groups, into tiers.
The target groups include: (1) persons who
“maintain homeland and national security”; (2) persons who “provide health care and community support services”; (3) persons who
13
“maintain critical infrastructure”; and (4) “the general population.”
The first tier within each group would receive top priority for vacci14
nation.
For the occupational groups—i.e., groups one through
three—the first tier includes deployed forces, critical health care personnel, emergency medical service personnel, and fire and police of15
ficers. For the general population, tier one would be limited to
pregnant women, infants, and toddlers, all of whom are expected to
16
have a higher risk of dying during a pandemic. After individuals in
the first tier of each group are vaccinated, supplies would be directed
17
to persons in the second, third, fourth, and fifth tiers.
18
DHHS has also issued guidance for the use of antiviral drugs.
Initial priorities would focus on efforts to contain or suppress initial
pandemic outbreaks anywhere in the world and to provide postexposure prophylaxis at the border to travelers entering the coun19
try. Then, the bulk of the stockpiled medications would be directed
to persons infected with pandemic influenza who present themselves
for care early in the course of their illness and who would benefit
20
from antiviral medications. Other priorities include prophylaxis for
health care workers, persons who have compromised immune systems, and persons living in residential settings such as nursing homes,
prisons, and homeless shelters when outbreaks occur in those set21
tings. The guidelines recognize that existing stockpiles will be insufficient to cover all of these categories, and conclude that, when supplies are limited, “treating all persons based on assessment of medical
need is considered preferable to targeting certain priority groups for
22
treatment.”
They also recommend that, in situations of limited
supply, treatment should be preferred to prophylaxis because “the
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN, supra note 10.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 7.
See DHHS, ANTIVIRAL USE, supra note 11.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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need is clear and benefits [are] likely to accrue for those who are
23
treated.”
The DHHS guidance documents are intended to be advisory on24
ly. They do not purport to be binding on the state, local, and tribal
planners who are the primary audience of the documents. In fact,
the vaccine guidance notes that “it is important that plans are flexible
as the guidance may be modified based on the status of vaccine technology, the characteristics of pandemic illness, and risk groups for severe disease—factors that will remain unknown until a pandemic ac25
tually occurs.”
Other countries’ prioritization plans differ in some respects
from the DHHS guidelines, but in general reflect similar considerations. In a 2006 analysis of national pandemic preparedness plans,
Uscher-Pines found that the overwhelming focus was on utilitarian
26
factors.
Thus, twenty-one plans emphasized the need to reduce
morbidity and mortality, while thirteen referred to the maintenance
of essential services or the “minimization of social and economic im27
pacts.” Individuals at high risk of infection were ranked consistently
28
at the top of resource allocation schedules. In addition, health care
workers and other essential service providers were given priority
29
Reasons offered for prioritizing
access in most national plans.
health care workers included the fact that such individuals were at increased risk of getting and transmitting infections, that they were necessary for recovery efforts, and that the availability of health care
30
workers would reduce overall morbidity and mortality in society.
III. ASSESSING THE PLANS: AGE, OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, AND THE
PRIMACY OF SOCIAL UTILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Existing prioritization plans share several common characteristics. I highlight here three features of these plans that I believe warrant greater attention. First, the plans all seek to save the most lives
possible without distinguishing between the value of lives based on

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.
DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN, supra note 10, at 1.
Id.
See Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 3, at 1724–26.
Id. at 1723.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1723–24.
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31

individuals’ ages.
Second, they prioritize certain occupational
groups, most commonly health care workers, but they often do not
clearly define the contours of these categories. Finally, they reflect
the general view that maximizing aggregate social welfare should be
the primary consideration in allocation decisions, despite the potential impact of such an approach on socially disadvantaged groups.
A. All Lives Are Equal, Regardless of Age
Existing plans for both vaccines and antiviral drugs seek to identify persons at the greatest risk of infection and death from the pandemic influenza virus and to ensure that these individuals have the
greatest chance of receiving prophylaxis and treatment. The implicit
judgment is that, when resources are scarce, the primary goal should
be to save as many lives as possible. Some commentators have argued
that such an approach is consistent with utilitarian ethical theories
because, during a pandemic, the number of lives saved is the best
32
measure of the aggregate social good. The view that all lives are
equally deserving of protection can also be seen as consistent with
egalitarian principles, insofar as it rests on the assumption that all individuals have inherently equal worth.
Yet, a serious weakness of treating all lives as inherently equal is
that such an approach ignores commonly held intuitions about the
implications of aging. In particular, the argument can be made that
the value of additional life declines over the course of an individual’s
lifespan. This is why the death of a young person is typically perceived as tragic, whereas the death of someone who has already lived
a full life is not.
The idea that young people’s lives are deserving of greater protection than the lives of older persons is sometimes referred to as the
“fair innings” argument, which is based on the idea that everyone de31
To the extent the U.S. plan incorporates age-related preferences, it is based on
predictions about which age groups will face the highest risk of death during a pandemic, not on the principle that saving the life of a younger person is more important than saving the life of an older person. In fact, the plan recommends that, in
some cases, older adults should be given higher priority than healthy young adults,
given “the much higher risk of severe illness and death experienced by older adults
in two of the previous three pandemics.” DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN, supra
note 10, at 10.
32
See Marcel Verweij, Equitable Access to Therapeutic and Prophylactic Measures,
ADDRESSING ETHICAL ISSUES IN PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING: DISCUSSION PAPERS 8
(World Health Organization, Geneva, Switz. 2008), http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/cds_flu_ethics_5web.pdf (“If we consider human life to be of
central value, consequentialism supports allocation of resources so as to save as many
lives as possible.”).
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serves to live through all the “innings,” or phases, of life. According
to one formulation of this argument, “[o]lder persons will have had
many more opportunities in their life than persons who die at young
age and therefore, when we can save some but not all, it is fair to save
34
younger people first.” The fair innings argument reflects the view
that fairness does not necessarily mean that everyone should have
equal access to the same amount of resources, but that everyone
should have an equal chance to live a complete life.
The pure version of the fair innings argument would give the
greatest preference to the youngest members of society—i.e., infants—on the ground that they have the most years of life ahead of
them. A variation of the argument, proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel
and Alan Wertheimer, would balance the amount of time a person
has left to live against the amount of time the person has already in35
vested in living. With this “investment refinement” to the standard
fair innings argument, a 20-year-old person would have greater priority than an infant “because the older individuals have more developed interests, hopes, and plans but have not had an opportunity to
36
realize them.” Emanuel and Wertheimer note that, during a pandemic, their approach would direct resources to individuals in the
37
age cohorts at highest risk of infection during the 1918 Spanish flu.
The insight that additional life years have diminishing value as
individuals become older poses a serious challenge to the view that
the goal of resource allocation should be to save as many lives as possible without attention to age. However, age-based prioritization systems also raise concerns of their own. First, even if we were to agree
that the number of years a person has left to live is a relevant criterion for allocating vaccines and antivirals, age is not always an accurate proxy for life expectancy. Factors such as genetics, health status,
and lifestyle also play important roles. Thus, basing prioritization decisions solely on age would not necessarily result in saving those
38
people with the greatest number of years left to live. Second, any

33
See id. at 10; see also Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the
“Fair Innings” Argument, 6 HEALTH ECON. 117, 119 (1997).
34
Verweij, supra note 32, at 10.
35
Emanuel & Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 854–55.
36
Id. at 855.
37
Id.
38
See Michael M. Rivlin, Why the Fair Innings Argument Is Not Persuasive, BMC MED.
ETHICS, Dec, 21, 2000, at 4, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-69391-1.pdf (“It is in fact not possible for two patients to have an identical condition,
bearing in mind the differences between both of a medical and, just as importantly, a
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official policy that treats the lives of those closer to death as less deserving of protection creates the danger of reinforcing biases and discrimination against the elderly.
These concerns, however, are not a sufficient justification for
completely excluding age from prioritization decisions. While age
may not correlate perfectly with life expectancy for every individual, it
is undeniable that, on average, there is a strong correlation between
the number of years one has lived and the number of years one has
left. In general, prioritization systems are based on the aggregate
impact of particular factors on a population level, even though individual exceptions to these general patterns will inevitably occur. For
example, pregnant women are given top priority for vaccines in the
DHHS plan because, on average, they face a higher risk of dying if
39
they become infected. The average correlation between pregnancy
and mortality is sufficient to justify the heightened priority, even
though the correlation does not mean that every single pregnant
woman who becomes infected during a pandemic would necessarily
die.
The risk that an age-related prioritization system would exacerbate ageism is certainly a serious consideration. However, the significance of this risk may depend on how a system of age-related preferences is implemented. For example, giving a bump up in priority to
broad categories like “adolescents” and “young adults” may pose less
of a risk of fostering biases against the elderly than a sliding scale approach in which each additional year of life is treated as a negative.
For this reason, the World Health Organization has recommended
that, if countries choose to incorporate age-related considerations in
vaccine and antiviral allocation systems, such categories should “rely
on broad life stages, rather than ranking individuals based on differ40
ences of only a few years.”
B. Membership in Particular Occupational Categories Justifies Priority
Access to Resources
A consistent feature of national pandemic preparedness plans is
the prioritization of certain occupational categories, particularly
health care workers. The logic of this approach is that, if individuals
social kind, that might have a significant effect on the health and prognosis of individuals.”).
39
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40
WORLD HEALTH ORG., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING A PUBLIC
HEALTH RESPONSE TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 6–7 (2007), http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/WHO_CDS_EPR_GIP_2007_2c.pdf.
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who are essential to the pandemic response effort become ill and die,
many more people are likely to die as a result. Thus, saving essential
workers means that everyone will be better off.
As a general matter, it is hard to argue with the general idea of
giving preferential treatment to individuals who are genuinely essential to the pandemic response effort. In fact, even commentators who
are strongly opposed to the use of general “social worth” criteria in
resource allocation decisions approve the preferential treatment of
individuals necessary to respond to crisis situations. Paul Ramsey, for
example, argued that “we should be indiscriminate in the care we
provide—just as God makes the rain fall on the just and the unjust
alike,” but that in a “focused community” in which survival of the
group is the primary objective, favoring those who contribute essen41
tial functions can be seen as a legitimate goal.
Giving priority in resource allocation to essential health care
workers is particularly justifiable if those individuals will have to assume greater-than-normal risks to their own health in order to carry
out their job responsibilities. For example, health care workers who
are exposed to influenza patients are likely to face a significantly
42
greater risk of infection than the general population.
Offering
these workers protection against infection may be a necessary incen43
tive to get them to agree to work. In addition, providing access to
vaccines and antivirals to individuals who expose themselves to lifethreatening risks as part of the pandemic response effort can be justified by the ethical principle of reciprocity, which states that those
who make sacrifices for the benefit of society have a greater claim to
44
benefits from society in return.
Nonetheless, basing preferential treatment on specific occupational categories is problematic because the categories are inherently
broad and may be difficult to contain within reasonable limits. For

41
See James F. Childress, Just Care: Rationing in a Public Health Crisis, UPDATE (Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr., Loma Linda, Cal.), Sept. 2005, at 1, 4 (citing PAUL RAMSEY,
THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 275 (1970)).
42
See Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals
to Work During an Influenza Pandemic, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (noting that
“[h]ealth care professionals who participate in the pandemic response effort are likely to face a significantly greater risk of infection than the rest of the population,” and
that, during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2003,
health care professionals accounted for nearly twenty percent of confirmed SARS
cases worldwide).
43
See id. at 42 (arguing that health care professionals who volunteer to work during a pandemic should receive priority access to vaccines and antivirals).
44
See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 40, at vi.
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example, should the category of “health care worker” include only
professionals with unique life-saving abilities, such as infectious disease specialists, or should it include anyone who works in a setting
that provides health care—including, for example, janitorial staff or
members of the billing department? If the goal is to ensure the continued functioning of hospitals and other health care providers, then
arguably anyone necessary to the maintenance of that institution
would have a claim to priority access. Yet, if anyone who works in a
health care institution is entitled to priority, it will be hard to justify
differential treatment for others who provide equally valuable societal
benefits, such as day care providers, bus drivers, or sanitation workers. In other words, unless the concept of “essential worker” is limited to an extremely narrow category of lifesavers, any distinctions
that are drawn may be perceived as arbitrary and hence unfair.
Reflecting these concerns, the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law recommended against prioritizing health care
workers and other first responders for access to ventilators during a
45
pandemic. According to the Task Force, if ventilators are in short
supply, prioritizing health care workers could mean that anyone who
is not a first responder would lack a realistic chance of having access
46
to ventilators. The Task Force also pointed out that prioritizing
health care workers could lead to “the appearance of favoritism, in
which those who devised the rationing system appeared to reserve
47
special access for themselves.”
Rather than giving priority access to broad occupational categories, planners should develop more finely tuned criteria for identifying individuals whose services are genuinely essential. Any expansion
beyond these narrow criteria should depend on a showing that an individual will be required to assume greater-than-normal risks as a result of performing services that will benefit the greater social good.

45

NEW YORK STATE WORKGROUP ON VENTILATOR ALLOCATION IN AN INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC, NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ALLOCATION OF
VENTILATORS IN AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: PLANNING DOCUMENT 27–28 (2007) (draft
for public comment), available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/
communicable/influenza/pandemic/ventilators/docs/ventilator_guidance.pdf.
46
Id. at 27.
47
Id. at 28. The Task Force noted that, although it rejected giving priority to
health care workers for access to ventilators, the considerations might be different
for decisions about vaccines and antivirals. See id.
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C. Promoting Aggregate Social Welfare and the Impact on Vulnerable
Populations
A general concern with utilitarian-based approaches to the allocation of scarce life-saving resources is that they may conflict with
other important societal values, particularly the values of equality and
non-discrimination. The problem is that, if the primary goal is ensuring that resources are deployed in the most cost-effective manner
possible, entire segments of the population may end up receiving
nothing. For example, developing a mechanism for delivering vaccines and antiviral medications to hard-to-reach rural populations will
inevitably cost more than using those resources in concentrated ur48
ban settings. Sending resources to developing countries, and helping those countries deploy those resources in the absence of welldeveloped health care infrastructures, will entail similar inefficiencies. In general, many of the most vulnerable segments of society
would suffer under a system that focuses primarily on the costeffective deployment of resources, including individuals who are
home bound or who have significant mobility restrictions, individuals
whose literacy or linguistic limitations prevent them from being easily
reached with public service messages, and individuals who face barriers in access to health care because of membership in stigmatized
social groups.
The impact of utilitarian-centric resource allocation policies on
vulnerable populations is particularly problematic in light of the fact
that individuals who are economically and socially disadvantaged
would probably suffer the greatest burdens of an influenza pandemic.
According to one recent study, if the next pandemic has mortality
patterns comparable to the 1918 Spanish flu, ninety-six percent of
49
deaths will occur in the developing world. Moreover, during the
Spanish flu, individuals from “lower social classes and [socially] oppressed groups had substantially higher mortality rates than the dominant or ruling population” in both wealthy and developing coun50
tries. Despite these concerns, the authors of the study found that no
country had systematically identified vulnerable populations in the
51
context of pandemic response efforts. Rather, discussions of vulnerability have been limited to individuals at “increased biological or

48

See Verweij, supra note 32, at 9–10.
Lori Uscher-Pines et al., Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Social Justice and
Disadvantaged Groups, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2007, at 32.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 35.
49
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52

medical risk of” infection or death. Only two of the plans surveyed
even mentioned “the barriers that the poor and other disadvantaged
people are likely to face in securing access to vaccines and antiviral[]”
53
medications.
In other contexts, we already accept that the pursuit of social
utility must be tempered with equality-based considerations. For example, Robert Veatch points out that our system for allocating organs
explicitly rejects several inequitable criteria that would make sense
54
from a purely utilitarian perspective. For example, the system does
not rely on HLA antigen matching for kidney transplantation, in part
because such an approach would systematically favor white over black
55
organ recipients. Similarly, the allocation system ignores “reliable
data showing that people of a certain age, race, income group, and
56
gender [do] predictably slightly better” as kidney recipients. Veatch
also argues that efforts to promote wider geographical regions for organ sharing also reflect “a victory for the justice perspective” over defenders of pure efficiency approaches, as broad geographic distribution “tends to favor equality of access, based on need, over
57
efficiency.”
Even the most ardent supporters of taking equality considerations into account in resource allocation decisions do not deny that
maximizing social utility is an important ethical value. The question
is ultimately one of balance—i.e., we must decide “how far [we] are
willing to have the overall level of health of the community reduced
58
in order to reduce inequalities in the distribution of health.” At
some point, attempting to compensate for economic and social disadvantages by deploying greater resources to vulnerable populations
can itself be seen as inconsistent with respect for equality if the
greater resources devoted to the vulnerable make it impossible to
care for other segments of society. Yet, in order to strike this balance,
the conflict between utility and equality must first be acknowledged.
Existing preparedness plans do not even take this first step.

52

Id.
Id. at 37.
54
Robert M. Veatch, Disaster Preparedness and Triage: Justice and the Common Good,
72 MT. SINAI J. MED. 236, 239–40 (2005).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 240.
57
Id.
58
Williams, supra note 33, at 122–23.
53
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IV. CONCLUSION
Existing plans for allocating vaccines and antivirals during a
pandemic are rational responses to a problem with no ideal solution.
Yet, several aspects of these plans deserve further consideration, particularly with respect to the role of age, the relevance of occupational
categories, and the impact of utility-based considerations on vulnerable populations. While no plan can perfectly resolve the competing
considerations, it is essential that the trade-offs are made explicit and
subject to broad public deliberation. This symposium has served a
valuable role in fostering this kind of discussion.

